Original research

Scoping review of countries’ practices missed by health emergency preparedness and response quantitative tools: COVID-19 and Ebola response experiences

Abstract

Introduction After the COVID-19 pandemic and previous disease outbreaks, it is critical to continuously examine the preparedness measurement tools and level of country preparedness for future health emergencies. Existing preparedness quantitative tools, such as the 2021 Global Health Security Index (GHSI) and Joint External Evaluation (JEE) second edition, may not fully reflect the country’s actual practices during an outbreak. This scoping review profiles countries’ practices, actions and experiences during Ebola and COVID-19 pandemics missed by these tools but critical to a successful response.

Methods Using the PRISMA checklist for scoping reviews, we documented country practices during health emergence responses. Our search strategy keywords included “actions/practices,” “preparedness/response,” “Ebola/COVID-19,” and “successes/experiences/challenges,” across PubMed, Medline, CINAHL, Embase, Google Scholar and WHO IRIS. English peer-reviewed articles published between January 2004 and October 2020 for Ebola and between January 2020 and December 2022 for COVID-19 were included. Articles were independently assessed for inclusion and discordant decisions were agreed on by consensus. A qualitative thematic analysis was conducted and findings were presented by a disease outbreak.

Results Out of 1913 studies screened, 36 were included. The COVID-19 and Ebola response practices, actions, and experiences not included in the GHSI 2021 and JEE second edition tools included; use of previous outbreaks lessons, cushioning the populations and putting in place mechanisms to support businesses, protection of vulnerable populations, leveraging the trust in leadership and role models, and innovative ways of engaging the public through use of technology.

Conclusion Countries’ outbreak response strategies depend on the available resources, the outbreak characteristics, its effects and how other countries are responding. This study suggests incorporating capacities of these response actions into existing tools and countries should make detailed plans on how they can leverage existing trust, protect the vulnerable, cushion citizens and businesses from epidemic effects, and innovatively use technology to engage the public in epidemic responses.

What is already known on this topic

  • Country capacities to respond to public health emergencies have been measured using quantitative measures and non-quantitative actions are often left out. Moreover, the links between the country’s capacities and the actual use of the capacities are not certain.

What this study adds

  • Epidemics such as COVID-19 and Ebola affect several sectors and need tailored response strategies to control them. Cushioning citizens and businesses from epidemic effects, innovative public engagement using technology, protection of vulnerable populations, trust in leadership and using previous outbreak experiences continue to shape and reshape how countries respond to epidemics.

How this study might affect research, practice or policy

  • This study suggests incorporating capacities of these response actions into existing tools and countries should make detailed plans on how they can leverage existing trust, protect the vulnerable, cushion citizens and businesses from epidemic effects and innovatively use technology to engage the public in epidemic responses.

Introduction

After the occurrence of the 2020–2022 COVID-19 pandemic and previous disease outbreaks, it is critical to continuously examine the preparedness measurement tools and level of country preparedness for future health emergencies. Efforts towards outbreak containment have been focused on strengthening countries’ reporting on the International Health Regulation (IHR) capacities,1 2 which are self-assessments by countries themselves. In 2017, the WHO launched the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool,3 which is a voluntary, collaborative and multisectoral process to assess countries’ capacities to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to public health risks that occur naturally, deliberate or accidental.4 5 Through the JEE assessment, countries are able to objectively identify the most critical gaps within their human and animal health systems, prioritise such gaps in order to strengthen preparedness and response.4 However, the IHR capacities and the JEE do not entirely measure how well countries are prepared for a future public health emergence because they are more focused on the presence of policies rather than actual policy implementation experiences and the importance of evidence-based leadership.6 The 2021 Global Health Security Index (GHSI) has combined information collected by the IHR and JEE and is able to identify gaps in a country’s capacities.7 8 The six categories of the GHSI are similar to the JEE and these include prevention, detection and reporting, rapid response, health system, commitments to improving national capacity, financing and global norms, and risk environment.9 However, initial analysis during the COVID-19 pandemic showed that higher GHSI scores did not translate into effective control of the COVID-19 pandemic.10 11 Countries with higher capacities according to the quantitative GHSI measure registered higher COVID-19 cases and deaths,11 which highlights the defficiences in existing quantitative tools. In addition, the GHSI showed no prediction of COVID-19 vaccine rollout response among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries.12 This not only highlights the challenges associated with quantitative indices but also unmeasured capacities by these tools. We sought to conduct a qualitative scoping review to profile countries’ practices, actions and experiences during Ebola virus disease (EVD) and COVID-19 missed by quantitative tools (GHSI 2021,9 JEE second edition13) but critical to a response to health emergencies as a matter of priority.

Materials and methods

This review aimed to document country practices and capacities towards health emergence response that are not captured by current quantitative indices or measures. We used the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) checklist for scoping reviews.

Eligibility criteria

We included English peer-reviewed articles published between January 2004 and October 2020 for Ebola and between January 2020 and December 2022 for COVID-19. Studies were included in the review if they met the following criteria: (a) demonstrated country-level efforts (including health and other departments) for public health emergency response, (b) clearly explained what interventions or activities were done during or immediately after the outbreak and (c) documented response actions not included in existing preparedness measurement tools.

Information sources and search strategy

Literature databases included PubMed, Medline, CINAHL Embase, Google Scholar and the WHO IRIS. The initial search for title and abstracts was conducted by an independent, experienced research assistant (RA) with previous experience in conducting scoping and systematic reviews. The study team oriented the RA on the study objectives and the search strategy before he conducted the initial and subsequent searches.

The search strategy was developed by the research team (online supplemental material 1). The keywords for the search strategy included (a) Actions/practices, preparedness/response, (b) Ebola/COVID-19, (c) Successes/experiences/challenges and (d) Outbreak/epidemic/pandemic. Search filters included free full text, English and excluded clinical trials. The three search strategies included (1) protocol-driven handsearch of journals and electronic search of databases, (2) snowballing by reference-chasing and tracking citations at the end of identified articles and (3) personal knowledge following existing theories and offhand discovery of suitable papers. The outcomes were filtered to include experiences, successes, achievements and challenges during any of the two outbreaks. The initial search was conducted on 20 December 2022, evaluated for its comprehensiveness and updated on 4 January 2023.

Publication selection

Articles in the final search were imported into a CSV file and uploaded into Rayyan software14 15 to ease collaboration. They were checked for duplication and unique titles at this stage constituted the final lists for review. Three study team members (JK, MN and JMS) independently reviewed the study titles and abstracts against the established inclusion criteria. Each member independently categorised each article into one of three categories: include, maybe or exclude. Reviewers were blinded to each other’s choices to avoid bias and discrepancies between reviewers were resolved through consensus building. We excluded studies not related to the topic of this review and had no suggestive implication of a country’s response to COVID-19 or EVD.

Data collection process

Data extraction was performed using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to extract the study title, study country, disease outbreak, factors that enhanced the outbreak response, WHO outbreak response pillar and a text extract supporting the WHO pillar. Themes of capacities that are not included in current preparedness measurement tools were also identified. The spreadsheet was exported to Google Sheets to enable collaborative and real-time data entry by independent full-study article reviewers (JK and MN). The studies were grouped into types of disease outbreaks (COVID-19 and EVD).

Synthesis methods

Articles that explicitly described country-level strategies or activities implemented during the outbreak, which are not included in current quantitative preparedness tools, were eligible for synthesis. Three team members selected such articles collectively. During data analysis, we conducted a qualitative thematic analysis to identify themes for practices, actions and experiences during Ebola and COVID-19 and presented findings by type of outbreak (table 1).

Table 1
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Practices, actions and experiences during COVID-19 and EVD response missed by quantitative preparedness tools

Results

Overall, 1913 citations were identified and retrieved from the initial search. After removing duplicates (10) and ineligible citations by automation tools (1635), 268 study articles were eligible for title and abstract review. Out of 268 studies, 145 did not meet the eligibility criteria, leaving 123 study articles eligible for full-text review. Following full-text review, 87 studies were further excluded due to absence of factors supporting outbreak response at country level or response strategies already included in existing preparedness tools. Ultimately, 36 studies were included in this scoping review (figure 1).

Figure 1
Figure 1

Flow diagram for the scoping reviews.

Following the synthesis from our reviewed literature, we summarise the findings into six themes of response actions not included in existing preparedness measurement tools in table 1. These themes included (1) learning and use of previous outbreak experiences; (2) trust in leadership, role models and community champions; (3) government actions to minimise secondary effects of response measures; (4) innovative public engagement using technology; (5) protecting the vulnerable and (6) ability to scale up and adapt existing platforms.

Discussion

In an era where countries are prone to in-country and cross-border health emergencies, there is the need to augment existing quantitative preparedness measures with lived actions and practices in the response to pandemics. Our scoping review highlights the relatively newer strategies employed by the countries that are not explicitly included in existing quantitative preparedness tools. The COVID-19 crisis was different in length from previous health emergencies and needed unique interventions in addition to those that were done previously for which preparedness indicators exist. Countries used all strategies in their reach, including following and adapting the WHO’s guidance (online supplemental material 2) to respond and control the spread of COVID-19. Though there are similarities in both the COVID-19 and Ebola responses strategies to previous epidemics, there were strategies in the response that countries employed that had not been extensively used in previous pandemics.

We found that countries leveraged experiences and lessons from previous outbreaks to respond to COVID-19. Lessons were not limited to outbreaks that happened within their countries but also experiences from other countries. These lessons continue to shape and reshape how countries respond to disease outbreaks. For example, adaptation of previous pandemic response plans shortened planning for the COVID-19 response and ochestrated the use of previous pandemic surveillance for timely reporting of cases,16 17 and Ebola experiences from West Africa inspired the development of new technology tools for COVID-19 contact tracing in Taiwan.18 Though such a tool may not replace the traditional contact tracing, it improves effectiveness and requires less resources compared with traditional contact tracing. A country’s ability to learn and use experiences from previous epidemics that occured either within or outside its boundaries would improve efficiencies in the response. It is, therefore, important to archive after-action review reports and to integrate past epidemic response strategies into countries preparedness and response plans.

Some countries leveraged the prevailing trust in leadership, role models and community champions to rally the population to take up testing, vaccination and adhere to prevention measures, although the hardships that were involved. For example, community health workers who were initially rejected by communities in Liberia during the Ebola outbreak because of their linkage to health facilities and community mistrust in health facilities, with time built relationships with the communities that helped to address trust and stigma around Ebola. They eventually conducted community engagement and social mobilisation on EVD control and prevention.19 Following experiences from the Ebola response, mistrust in the government of Sierra Leone negatively affected the COVID-19 testing, vaccination and adherence to preventive measures.20 Trust in the leadership, role models and community champions as well as in the healthcare system should be evaluated and leveraged during the pandemic response.

Some epidemic control measures such as prolonged lockdowns, negatively affected economic activities in countries. Our findings show that governments took economic and social actions to not only minimise secondary effects of COVID-19 response measures but also strengthen adherence to quarantine during the peak of the pandemic. Families and businesses were impacted and some countries intervened by providing subsidies to business enterprises and in some cases providing stimulus cheques directly to their citizens.21 22 Citizens spent these funds majorly on food items. This helped cushion both the businesses and the citizens from the effects of a prolonged pandemic. On a microeconomic level, the Chinese government increased investment and issued targeted loans to enterprises to boost the economy and improve household incomes.23 The shutdown of businesses, loss of jobs and the impact of countermeasures such as lockdowns suggest that during a prolonged pandemic, citizens need protection measures such as unemployment insurance that can be sustainable for a long period of time. Global standards on social protection during a prolonged pandemic would guide countries on how to support their citizens in such crises.24

With restrictions on movement and social distancing countermeasures, countries adapted and exploited the use of information technology (IT) in various forms. Our findings show that countries were able to develop technology solutions on the go and used them to engage the public during the pandemic. Technology was used in infection detection through information transfer, to assess risk of infection, tracking infected individuals and interventions and during postintervention as telemedicine.25 Phone applications using distance points were used to not only notify users if they were getting close to a person infected with COVID-19 but also used for contact tracing.26 27 Countries’ ability to develop and use technology on the go during COVID-19 demonstrated their potential to integrate technology into future disease outbreaks responses.

As countries grappled with controlling the pandemic, it was important to protect the vulnerable population, especially the elderly and those with chronic diseases from COVID-19 infection.28 Vulnerable populations are at increased risk because of their conditions, limited preparedness planning for them, increased risk of exposure and service disruption.29 Telemedicine and telepharmacy were used to review patients who did not need urgent care or invasive procedures and deliver medication, shielding them from the high risk of COVID-19 infection at health facilities.30 31 These experiences indicate the need for countries to consider the vulnerable groups when responding to disease outbreaks.29

We also found that a country’s ability to scale up and adapt existing platforms to respond to the outbreak was handy to control the epidemic. There was creativity in repurposing existing infrastructure to respond to COVID-19. To increase the uptake of testing for COVID-19, countries like South Korea and Israel implemented drive-through testing.32 33 This increased the volume of individuals tested and treated despite the limited number of PPE used by health workers.34 In UAE, field hospitals were set up to reduce the patient load in major hospitals.35 As countries develop or revise their emergency contingency plans, the inclusion of infrastructure that can be repurposed such as hotels, treatment centres is very important in the event of surge capacity.

Limitations

This scoping review included publications in English for countries that had published experiences, and therefore, excluded non-English publications and grey literature that may have offered additional insights. We were also unable to link the strategies presented to actual successful responses. More research is needed to quantify and associate response strategies to indicators of a successful response.

Conclusion

In summary, it is evident that for a disease outbreak that lasts as long as COVID-19 did (over 3 years), countries’ response strategies depend on the resources at hand, the characteristics of the pandemic, its effects and how other countries are responding. Our study highlights COVID-19 and Ebola response practices, actions and experiences critical to epidemic response but not included in the GHSI 20219 and JEE second edition13 quantitative tools. These included the use of lessons from previous outbreaks, cushioning the populations by addressing their welfare needs and putting in place mechanisms to support businesses, protection of vulnerable populations using telemedicine, leveraging the trust in leadership and role models and innovative ways of engaging the public through use of technology. In addition to incorporating response actions and capacities into existing quantitative preparedness measurement tools, countries should make detailed plans on how they can leverage existing trust, use lessons from previous epidemics, protect the vulnerable, cushion citizens and businesses from epidemic effects and innovatively use technology to engage the public in epidemic responses. A quantitative measure of the extent governments can cushion the economic effects of the pandemic, for example, funds in the country’s budget per population expected to be affected by the pandemic can be considered.